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ABSTRACT
A great deal of research has been devoted to the exploration and categorization of threats posed from 
malicious attacks from current employees who are disgruntled with the organisation, or are motivated 
by financial gain. These so-called “insider threats” pose a growing menace to information security, 
but given the right mechanisms, they have the potential to be detected and caught. In contrast, human 
factors related to aspects of poor planning, lack of attention to detail, and ignorance are linked to the 
rise of the accidental or unintentional insider. In this instance there is no malicious intent and no prior 
planning for their “attack,” but their actions can be equally as damaging and disruptive to the organi-
sation. This chapter presents an exploration of fundamental human factors that could contribute to an 
individual becoming an unintentional threat. Furthermore, key frameworks for designing mitigations 
for such threats are also presented, alongside suggestions for future research in this area.
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this current chapter is to examine the impact human factors, including aspects of person-
ality traits or cognitive factors that can serve to influence cybersecurity practices and behaviors. The 
background against which this exploration is framed is related to the insider threat, more specifically 
those that have no specific motive or malicious intent. The chapter will begin with an examination of 
key statistics related to cybercrime in business as well as introducing current concerns related to the 
‘insider threat’. The typology of the insider threat will be discussed in brief, but then will shift to focus 
more directly on the notion of an ‘accidental insider’ – those individuals who have no malicious intent 
to commit transgressions of cybersecurity, but do so through misjudgment, ignorance and lack of un-
derstanding/knowledge.
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Following on from this, the focus will then turn towards research examining key human factors that 
could influence the cybersecurity posture of the individual. This includes potential links between psy-
chology traits such as impulsivity, decision-making and conscientiousness and information security. The 
concluding aspects for the chapter will focus on key techniques and frameworks that have the potential 
to change the behaviors of end-users. These techniques hopefully move individuals towards better cyber-
inoculation, and provide mitigation for the threat from the accidental insider.
BACKGROUND
In a recent report published by the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2016) it was estimated that online 
fraud was costing companies an estimated £193bn. Furthermore, the survey also noted that 5.8 million 
individual incidents of cybercrime had been reported in the year 2015-16; these were split between 
fraudulent activities (bank/credit card account fraud/advance fee fraud) and computer misuse (distri-
bution of computer viruses/unauthorized access to computers/hacking). The Business Crime Survey 
(BCS, 2015) also noted a 55% increase in reported online fraud between 2014-15. In the same report, 
one of the key concerns raised was the growing threat from individuals within the organization, or the so 
called ‘insider threat’. This latter point is mirrored by an apparent realization by researchers within the 
information security community that, for the most part, the weakest element in the cybersecurity chain 
is that of the human (Anwar et al., 2016; Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts, 2011; Sasse, Brostoff, 
& Weirich, 2001; Sasse & Flechais, 2005).
In the context of the continued fight to protect business and organizations from the threat being posed 
by information theft and cybercrime a great deal of attention is devoted to improving the existing secu-
rity infrastructure (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). Attempts to enhance network security via technological 
solutions such firewalls, intrusion detection, and biometric devices provide some legitimate protection 
against a wide variety of threats. However, these steps make an assumption that all threats to the security 
of the organization are inward facing, and come from an external source or attacker. Early commenta-
tors in the area of cybersecurity noted that one of the biggest barriers to creating effective information 
security strategies is the human elements within the system (Whitten & Tygar, 1998). From a usability 
perspective it is noted that, for the most part, security protocols and systems are either too confusing 
or too difficult for the average end-user to engage in effectively (Whitten & Tygar, 1998; Sasse & Fle-
chais, 2005). Accordingly, Sasse and Flechais (2005) noted that the situation is further complicated by 
additional aspects related to human factors including:
• A lack of understanding on behalf of employees about the importance of the data, software and 
systems within an organisation
• Ignorance about the level of risk attached to the assets for which they have direct responsibility 
for and
• A lack of understanding about how their behaviour could be putting the same assets at risk (Sasse 
& Flechais, 2005).
48
The “Human Factor” in Cybersecurity
 
EXAMINING THE INSIDER THREAT
Establishing the Concept of ‘an Insider’
In any system that incorporates an aspect of human activity the concept of ‘insider threat’ has the poten-
tial to impact on that system. In recent years the concept of insider threat has garnered more attention, 
presenting a growing concern for the internal security of organizations (Greitzer, Kangas, Noonan, & 
Dalton, 2010; Greitzer et al., 2016; Keeney, 2005; Probst, Hunker, Gollmann, & Bishop, 2010). In the 
context of businesses, the threat from an insider is multifaceted and can related to breaches in security, 
effects on the outward prestige of the company, and related financial loss (CPNI, 2013).
Defining a workable framework for insider threat in the context of cyber systems has proven prob-
lematic. Bishop and Gates (2008) noted a great deal of disagreement surrounding the definitions of what 
constitutes an insider threat. They pointed out that such a lack of consistency has the effect of prevent-
ing the development of a clear theoretical framework for investigating such an issue. With this view in 
mind, Bishop and Gates (2008) suggested that a unified approach would allow clearer and more effec-
tive methods for the detection of such threats. Moreover, the problematic nature of this area is further 
compounded when questions about what should be seen as “inside” and what elements remain “outside” 
of the threat perimeter are considered.
The label of insider threat makes an erroneous assumption that there is a clearly defined ‘inside’ within 
which any particular threat can be clearly encapsulated. The parameters that contribute to the notion 
of an insider become further blurred when viewed against the backdrop of modern working practices. 
This is particularly salient in instances where companies are increasingly outsourcing aspects of work 
to subcontractors or where the use of mobile computing allows any number of external bodies access to 
systems outside the physical sphere (Bishop & Gates, 2008).
In order to provide a theoretical framework for further discussion, the following section presents a 
brief overview of the research exploring the malicious insider threat. This is contrasted to threats based 
on ignorance, lack of education, and awareness, or the commonly referred to accidental or unintentional 
insider threat.
The Malicious Insider
Much of the research literature on the insider threat focuses on the view that these are individuals who 
have deep-seated malicious intent, and are conducting covert activities for financial and personal gain. 
For example, the definition presented by Cappelli, Moore, and Silowash (2012) is:
A current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized access to an 
organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner 
that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information 
or information systems. (p. xiii)
The research exploring the underlying psychology of the malicious insider is based, for the most part, 
on a small number of case studies in which the insider threat has been caught. For example Cappelli, 
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Moore, and Trzeciak, (2012) explored findings from ten case studies. Other researcher, such as Shaw, 
Ruby, and Post (1998) had previously identified four core indicators for an individual to becoming an 
insider threat, these included:
1.  Negative Life Experiences: In this instance the individual expresses their disgruntlement with 
set-backs in their life through overt displays of anger which are directed towards both peers and 
those in positions of authority. The individual also presents a low threshold for frustration which 
is also overtly manifest through aggressive outburst.
2.  Lack of Social Skills and Isolation: Insiders are assumed to demonstrate a lack of social skills and 
also exhibit a tendency for social isolation. There is some suggestion here that an a priori lack of 
social skills may preclude the individual in question to becoming isolated, which in turn may lead 
them to pursue such interactions in other ways such as through online social networking. This heavy 
reliance on computer-mediated forms of communication means that such individuals are unable to 
deal with social/emotional issues encountered in workplace situations effectively. As suggested by 
Shaw et al. (1998) a combination of these elements could lead to the individual retaining feelings of 
frustration and disgruntlement. This in turn could be overtly viewed in difficult social interactions 
with peers and work colleagues as well as what is termed “emotional leakage”, outbursts that are 
of a magnitude that far outweigh the nature of the incident.
3.  Sense of Entitlement: Insiders are proposed to suffer from a sense of entitlement, usually afforded 
to them via special privileges or access rights they have been permitted in pursuit of their duties. 
The individual may possess a special skill set that allows them to leverage such special treatment 
and may be further manifest through poor treatment of peers whom they may view as inferior. They 
may also have difficulty in adapting to specific rules or protocols that have been put into place by 
the organisation, perhaps fitting into the Proprietors category highlighted earlier.
4.  Ethical Flexibility: This is another area in which insiders are deemed to exhibit some degree of 
underdevelopment. This notion means that insiders may suffer from an inability to empathize with 
colleagues or others that would usually prevent an individual from engaging in acts of insider threat. 
Such immaturity is also linked to a breakdown in the inhibitory processes that control emotional 
outbursts in aspects such as aggression.
Findings from the CPNI (2013) report added some more specific detail to the personality traits that 
have been associated with those who have committed insider threat. In the context of the CPNI report 
insider threat was defined as ‘a person who exploits, or has the intention to exploit, their legitimate ac-
cess to an organisation’s assets for unauthorised purposes’ (p. 4). This study explored 120 UK-based case 
studies on insider threat, and collated those key elements that had a significant impact on behaviour as 
well as others within the environment. These personality traits are summarised as:
• Immaturity: The individual is seen to lack in overall life experience and falls into the category 
of being “high maintenance” in terms of the attention and guidance they require; also have clear 
difficulties in making critical life decisions.
• Low Self-Esteem: Lacks confidence in social situations and has a heavy dependence on recogni-
tion and praise from others; finds it hard to cope with adverse social situations, criticism and tasks 
that fall outside of their comfort zone.
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• Amoral and Unethical: The individual lacks any clear understanding of morality and shows no 
remorse for their behaviour, particularly in terms of the effect this may have on others.
• Superficial: The majority of insiders lack a clear sense of self and identity, presenting someone 
that is described as being “hard to know” by peers and colleagues.
• Restless and Impulsive: A common element that crops up in a variety of places when discussing 
the nature of the insider’s personality. Individual is seen to require constant stimulation and also is 
highly hedonistic (the requirement to seek pleasure above all other needs is apparent in someone 
with a hedonistic personality).
• Lacks Conscientiousness: Has a disregard for established rules and practices; clearly neglects 
workplace duties and responsibilities; poor attention to detail, poor judgement and a lack of focus.
• Manipulative: Uses their skills of persuasion to get their own way and will garner relationships 
that will serve to nurture their own self-interest. Also seen to adopt a social position that aids in 
serving their own needs, such as being agreeable and compliant to those in position of power.
• Emotionally Unstable: Prone to a variety of exaggerated mood swings and overt over reactions 
to problems; appears to complain about the most trivial of incidents.
• Evidence of Some Underlying Psychological or Personality Disorder: The CPNI report is 
vague about this aspect with little specific details on this aspect of the personality profile for the 
Insider, or indeed how this aspect was measured in their study.
Further to this, the CPNI report also highlights situational aspects that are evident in the psychosocial 
environment of the insider. These elements are split into two underlying categories:
• “Lifestyle changes” which are related to a change in personal circumstances and thus a change in 
experienced levels of stress.
• “Circumstantial vulnerabilities” which in the context of the CPNI report refer to “work, profile or 
personal issues that could make an individual vulnerable” (p.11).
The CPNI report presents a number of key predictors, based on aspects of the individual’s life experi-
ences and psychological factors, viewed as being of critical importance in the development of a potential 
insider threat. These are:
• Demonstrating Poor Work Attitude: A failure to follow accepted protocol or to read important 
documentation about new procedures or operating instructions.
• Shows Signs of Being Stressed: Overt symptoms of stress that include loss of temper, apathy 
(burnout), increase in nervous habits (ticks, aspects of OCD), problems with memory and concen-
tration, evidence of confusion, difficulty in making decisions.
• Exploitable or Vulnerable Lifestyle: Has an element of their lifestyle which allows them to be 
exploited by an external force or agent e.g. serious financial stress, alcohol abuse, drug addiction, 
gambling – each of these could lead to a strong desire for financial gain.
• Exploitable or Vulnerable Work Profile: The individual’s position within the company allows 
them access to highly prized or sought-after assets which in turn could be marketed for profit
• Recent Negative Life Events: A variety of elements could be included here, such as problems 
at work, loss of status (socially and work), personal injury, bereavement, relationship breakup, 
financial difficulty or loss.
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However, these concepts are only directly applicable to those attacks accompanied by a level of 
intentionality or direct motive. Other researchers have argued against the overarching label of ‘insider 
threat’ and moved towards a more flexible term of insiderness (Bishop, Gollmann, Hunker, & Probst, 
2008; Hunker & Probst, 2011). These researchers have argued that insider threat is more adequately 
represented in the form of a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Hunker and Probst (2011) compared 
the actions of an accidental insider to that of a ‘real insider’, with the latter being the group of individu-
als who exhibit malicious intent in their exploits. This real insider group also poses a great deal of skill 
and expertise, which could include knowledge related to programming, IT infrastructure and company 
systems that allow for a more holistic view of the attack landscape. At the opposite end of the continuum 
there are the accidental or unintentional insiders, who may have limited knowledge of accepted security 
protocols, their actions are obvious, and they make no direct attempt to cover up their mistakes. It is 
these ‘accidental insiders’ who present the focus for this current chapter, alongside an examination of 
how individual differences could make certain people more prone to lapses in cybersecurity.
The Accidental or Unintentional Insider
In order to account for incidences of unintentional insider threat (UIT; CERT, 2013) a further definition 
was presented:
An unintentional insider threat is a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who 
has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and who, through action or 
inaction without malicious intent, causes harm or substantially increases the probability of future serious 
harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information 
systems. (CERT, 2013, p. ix)
This definition for UIT focuses directly on threat as a result of inaction or indeed a specific lack of 
knowledge on the behalf of the individual alongside the lack of actual intent to cause harm. Thus, the 
key components to the conceptualization of UIT are elements of human failure or limitations related to 
human performance (CERT, 2013). This has the potential to include mistakes made though time pres-
sures exerted as a result of a job, the level of task difficulty, a lack of knowledge, and cognitive factors 
such as inattention (CERT, 2013). Examples of unintentional insider threat presented by CERT (2013) 
included the accidental disclosure of sensitive information (either via website, email or fax); an individual 
devolving log-in details (password and username) as a result of social engineering or via malware/spy-
ware; the improper disposal of physical records; and the loss of information through the misplacement 
of portable equipment including smartphones, USB drives, CDs and hard drives. These random acts are 
of greater potential concern for organizations as they typically have no motive, no direct intent and no 
prior indicators upon which to act. Unfortunately, the end result is still the same, and the actions of the 
unintentional insider can be as damaging as those perpetrated by the malicious attacker.
The concept of UIT presents another perspective from which researchers and security professionals 
can begin to explore the potential threats presented in any system that incorporates humans. The CERT 
(2014) report noted that over 40% of computer and organizational security professionals believed ac-
cidental insiders were the greatest potential source of risk. However, to date, very few attempts have 
been made to examine how aspects of human factors serve to influence the potential for UIT. This may 
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be in part due to a lack of research focus or the belief that technical solutions alone can provide the 
mitigation for such.
The rest of this chapter will focus on exploring how a better understanding of underlying human 
factors could influence aspects of cybersecurity. The first part will explore research that attempted to 
develop effective scales in order to assess the individual’s adherence to effective cybersecurity principles 
alongside key psychological traits.
Assessing Information Security Behaviors
A variety of attempts have been made to create effective scales designed to record aspects individual 
adherence to cybersecurity protocols. For the most part these have been deployed in work-based envi-
ronments, with a respective gap in scales being developed for younger populations and individuals not 
in employment. It has also been noted that many previous scales have a very narrow focus and explore 
just one aspect of cybersecurity such as passwords (Stanton et al. (2005), mobile computing (Mylonas 
et al., 2013) and specific security features of key applications (Furnell et al., 2006; Parsons, McCormac, 
Butavicius, Pattinson, & Jerram, 2014).
Siponen, Pahnila, and Mahmood (2010) presented one recent attempt to produce a scale that was 
designed to explore individual attitudes towards information security. The focus of this study was to 
examine key reasons why certain employees were more likely to comply with the cybersecurity polices 
of the organization. Their findings suggested that the existence of social pressure from both peers and 
superiors within their organization influenced the potential for adherence to such policies. It was noted 
that if peers and superiors have a positive cybersecurity posture this would in turn permeate throughout 
the organization to its other members. The individual’s self-efficacy in the context of cybersecurity was 
also shown to be a key determiner in their capacity to engage in effective cyber inoculation. For example, 
Siponen et al. (2010) present the instance of an individual who unwittingly sends confidential information 
out through email without encrypting it. According to Siponen et al. (2010) the individual must have the 
knowledge or capacity to encrypt this information before they can actually engage in that behavior. From 
this regard, if the individual has no awareness of the security policies of the organization, they cannot 
align to them, and hence are in danger of contravening them through ignorance and misunderstanding. 
However later researchers noted that the items used within the scale produced by Siponen et al. (2010) 
were very basic in nature and had the potential to produce an inherent bias, thus leading to an overall 
underestimation of the current security issues being faced within organisations (McCormac, Parsons, 
Zwaans, Butavicius, & Pattinson, 2016).
Egelman and Peer (2015a, 2015b) presented the development of the Security Behavior Intention Scale 
(SeBIS) that comprised of 16-items designed to assess adherence to information security advice. The 
SeBIS included 4 key sub-scales that measured attitudes towards password generation, securing digital 
devices, engaging in proactive awareness and updating software. In their initial testing, the researchers 
explored the relationship of security behaviors to a variety of psychological constructs. These included:
• Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DoSpeRT; Blais & Weber, 2006):
 ◦ A measure that explores the capacity to engage in risk taking behaviours across five key 
areas including ethical, financial, health and safety, recreational and social.
• General Decision-Making Style (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995):
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 ◦ A measure for how people approach decision-making in association with five dimensions 
that include rationality, avoidance, dependence, intuition and spontaneity.
• Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984):
 ◦ This is an individual’s preference or tendency to engage in and gain pleasure from cogni-
tively effortful activities.
• Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995):
 ◦ Explores impulsivity on three dimensions related to non-planning, attention and motor 
impulsiveness.
• Consideration for Future Consequences (CFC; Joireman, Shaffer, Balliet, & Strathman, 2012):
 ◦ This scale measures the individual’s capacity to consider potential future outcomes for their 
present actions.
The results from initial testing using the SeBIS demonstrated a variety of relationships with the 
above measures. Each of the four sub-scales for the SeBIS correlated positively with inquisitiveness 
as measured by the need for cognition scale. Individuals who exhibit higher levels of NFC are perhaps 
more questioning details of their daily life which could impact their cybersecurity, and this inquisitive-
ness leads them to investigate and explore rather than ignore or accept. Similarly, a consideration of the 
consequences of their actions (as measured through the CFC) also showed positive correlations with 
the four sub-scales of the SeBIS. The authors of the report suggested that a more active engagement 
in cybersecurity is linked directly to a capacity to assess how their current decisions may affect their 
future. This maps well onto the finding that the three subscales of the BIS, which measures impulsivity, 
were negatively correlated with security sub-scales measured on the SeBIS; those individuals who are 
quick to act or lack impulse control are those who may quickly respond to a spam email or phishing 
attack. Aspects of decision-making also demonstrated correlations with a number of sub-scales from 
the SeBIS. For instance, the rational sub-scale of the GDMS showed a positive correlation with aspects 
of password protection, general security awareness and updating software. The concept of rationality 
has been linked to a deliberate and logical approach to decision-making, and it has also been noted that 
those individuals who have a rational approach to decision-making are more likely to assume a personal 
responsibility for decision that affect them (Scott & Bruce, 1995). The avoidant decision-making type, 
typified by an individual who puts off or procrastinates about making decisions was negatively correlated 
to each of the four sub-scales from the SeBIS. There was an associated link between the dependence 
style of decision-making and scores on the SeBIS too, with those less likely to need help or assistance 
in their decision-making having a higher level of overall security awareness. Egelman and Peer (2015b) 
suggested that those individuals who were more proactive about their security had a less of a capacity 
to rely on others for information.
In the context of the present discussion the findings from Egelman and Peer (2015a, b) provided 
one of the first attempts to assess how individual differences could have a direct impact on their cy-
bersecurity behaviors. It would appear that those individuals who are more inquisitive, more rational 
and less prone to procrastination in decision-making represent those more likely to engage in effective 
cybersecurity behaviors. The benefits of knowing such information presents the theoretical possibility of 
system design with such differences in mind. This could potentially allow the implementation of system 
messages and warnings that are tailored to the individual, hence presenting a more targeted mitigation 
to poor cybersecurity behaviors.
54
The “Human Factor” in Cybersecurity
 
The SeBIS was later employed in further research by Tischer et al. (2016) who examined the potential 
for individuals to plug in USB devices that had been littered around a university campus. This strategy 
is often presented as a key mechanism for infiltration used by social engineers who leave such devices 
in prominent places in an attempt to gain entry to highly protected systems (Tischer et al., 2016). The 
pathway to gaining access is via the device, which is usually loaded with malware allowing the social 
engineer remote access to system once it has been plugged into a networked computer. In contrast to 
Egelman and Peer’s work, Tischer et al. (2016) found that individuals who were more likely to plug in 
a USB device were no risker when compared to a matched sample. In fact, those individuals who did 
plug in the USB were more risk averse in all categories apart from that of recreational risk. However it 
appears that individuals devolve responsibility for their protection of the computer and security mea-
sures deployed on it, or are ignorant of the risks attached to poor cybersecurity practices (Tischer et al., 
2016). Tischer et al. (2016) also used the SeBIS, but noted that the internal reliability of the scale was 
found to be much lower than had originally been found in the original research by Egelman and Peer 
(McCormac et al., 2016).
One of the most recently developed scales designed to explore the information security of individuals 
is the Human Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q; (Parsons et al., 2017, 2014). The 
HAIS-Q comprises of a variety of items that assess three key elements in the context of cybersecurity; 
these are knowledge, attitude and behavior. The underlying structure of the HAIS-Q examines these 
constructs in 5 core areas including password management, email use, Internet use, Social networking, 
incident reporting, mobile computing and information handling (Parsons et al., 2014). Higher scores on 
the HAIS-Q indicate a good awareness of information security, whilst a lower score demonstrates lack 
of knowledge as well as the propensity to engage in potentially risky activities, e.g. sharing passwords. 
The HAIS-Q has undergone an impressive amount of testing across a broad spectrum of populations 
establishing a robust test-retest reliability in the process (see Parsons et al., 2017).
In the context of exploring individual differences in security behaviors, the HAIS-Q was paired with 
key demographic and personality factors in a study by McCormac, Zwaans, et al., (2016). Scores on the 
HAIS-Q were shown to differ significantly across age groups, with the overall observation being that 
those in the older age groups demonstrated higher overall scores for information security. In order to 
assess if this relationship was influenced by age-related differences in risk taking behaviors, the research-
ers controlled for this and noted that the correlation between age and scores on the HAIS-Q persisted, 
although were slightly weaker. A gender difference between males and females was also noted, with 
females presenting significantly higher scores on the HAIS-Q compared to males, although the authors 
noted that the effect size for such a result was small. So in this instance age and gender both present as 
potential sources for individual differences in cybersecurity-related behaviors. The unknown element 
here is if these sources for variance in cybersecurity can be accounted for, and if effective system design 
could serve to isolate and mitigate the impact from such.
The work by McCormac et al. (2016) also included an exploration of how personality traits and a 
measure of risk taking were associated with scores on the HAIS-Q. The study used the five-factor model 
of personality, with the most frequently cited version used being that by John and Srivastava (1999), 
shown in Table 1.
A significant positive relationship between the personality traits of agreeableness, openness and 
conscientiousness with scores on the HAIS-Q were observed from the research by McCormac et al. 
(2016). Furthermore, a negative correlation was noted between risk-taking and scores on the HAIS-Q, 
with those less likely to engage in risky behaviors having higher overall scores. These findings were 
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noted as being in partial agreement with previous research (Pattinson et al., 2015) which also found 
that aspects of agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness served to explain the most variance in 
information security behaviors (McCormac, Zwaans, et al., 2016).
The research reviewed above provides a wide and somewhat contrasting basis for examining human 
factors in the context of cybersecurity. It would appear that there is some commonality in the findings 
that have examined self-reported cybersecurity knowledge, attitudes and behaviors. Predominately, in-
dividual differences in aspects of personality have the potential to predict to what level that individual 
will engage in information security behaviors. It appears that those who are more conscientious, open, 
agreeable, risk adverse and rational are those more likely to positively engage in effective cybersecurity 
behaviors. Alongside these personality traits it would also appear that both age and gender also serve as 
important moderators of active information security behavior further complicating issues.
SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Mitigating the threat posed by the accidental insider is, on the face of it, not easily accomplished. There 
is often an assumption made that those aspects of employee behavior which serve to create a level of risk 
for the organization relates directly to a lack of understanding (Coventry, Briggs, Jeske, & Van Moorsel, 
2014). The sheer scope of information security behavior that need to be enhanced, modified or altered 
provide a clear challenge for any awareness campaign. The list is long and there is no potential ‘one-size 
fits all’ approach which could effectively be applied to bring awareness for just a few of these elements. 
These aspects can include:
• Regularly updating anti-virus software.
• Using only trusted and secure connections, including Wi-Fi.
• Updating existing software.
• Awareness of physical surroundings (e.g. preventing shoulder surfing).
• Reporting suspicious behaviour.
• Keeping up-to-date with current threats.
• An awareness of trusted sites and services.
Table 1. The five-factor model of personality as taken from John and Srivastava (1999; p.121)
Factor Name Description
Extraversion An energetic approach to the social and material world and incudes traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality.
Agreeableness Contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation towards others with antagonism and includes traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust and modesty.
Conscientiousness Socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task and goal oriented behavior, such as thinking before acting, delaying gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing tasks.
Neuroticism Contrasts emotional stability and even-temperedness with negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and tense.
Openness In contrast to closed-mindedness, describes the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life.
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• Ensuring passwords are strong enough.
• Limiting the amount of personal information being shared online (Coventry et al., 2014).
In order to overcome these potential deficiencies, Coventry et al. (2014) noted that organizations 
often implement a wide variety of training schemes in an attempt to educate end-users (Leach, 2003). 
The effectiveness of these training programs is often limited to a unidirectional process where employ-
ees are presented with ‘best practice’, and behavioral change is attempted through the use of ‘expert’ 
advice (Coventry et al., 2014). A recent report produced by the Information Security Forum (ISF, 2014) 
presented a wide range of reasons as to why security awareness training failed to fully engage the human 
participant within the process. These key points included:
1.  Solutions are not aligned to the business risks.
2.  Neither progress nor value is measured.
3.  Incorrect assumptions are made about people and their motivations.
4.  Unrealistic expectations are set.
5.  The correct skills are not deployed.
6.  Awareness is just background noise (ISF, 2014: 1).
For many individuals it would appear that awareness training becomes an unnecessary burden that 
must be completed as part of their daily work lives. If expectations placed on the individual employee 
are also set too high, and the capacity to deploy the skills they have learned is stifled, there is a potential 
for both time and resources to be wasted.
The actual way in which such awareness training is conveyed can also have a significant impact on its 
effectiveness for eliciting a change in behavior. For example, Khan, Alghathbar, Nabi, and Khan (2011) 
noted that educational/academic presentations and group-based discussions served to enhance the knowl-
edge, attitude, intention to engage and behaviors of those studied. Other forms of communication, such 
as emails, newsletters, videogames, posters and computer-based training all had limited effectiveness 
in terms of getting individuals to change their behaviors and engage in more effective security activities 
(Khan et al., 2011).
A variety of attempts have been made to utilize behavioral change mechanisms in the context of cy-
bersecurity (Coventry et al., 2014; Jeske, Coventry, & Briggs, 2013; Turland, Coventry, Jeske, Briggs, 
& van Moorsel, 2015). However, it is noted that these attempts are exceptions rather than the norm. 
Other researchers have pointed out that there is a potential to use aspects of behavioral economics as a 
mechanism for eliciting behavioral change (Briggs, Jeske, & Coventry, 2016). Behavioral economics is 
starkly contrasted to the standard economic model in terms of human decision making and behavior, with 
the latter asserting that an individual is fully rational when engaged in decision making and is always 
mindful of the consequences for their actions (Briggs et al., 2016). The standard economic model has 
appeared at be an idealistic view of human information processing and has failed to adequately explain 
the actual behaviors of individuals in any number of key settings. Behavioral economics on the other 
hand adopts a more pragmatic approach by highlighting several key principles proposed to account for 
the irrationality of human behavior. This work was formalized in the work of Thaler and Sunstein (2008), 
which presented the basis for exploring how predictable deviations from rational processes could in turn 
be used to ‘nudge’ an individual towards a more desirable decision (Briggs et al., 2016).
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The MINDSPACE framework, originally developed by Dolan et al. (2012) has been used by a variety 
of researchers to capture the key influencers for behavioral change. These elements are included in Table 2.
Coventry et al. (2014) used the MINDSPACE framework provided by Dolan et al., as a basis for 
creating a set of behavioral nudges to prevent individuals from choosing insecure wireless networks. 
The researchers highlighted a series of possible nudges aligned to specific scenarios that could be used 
in a practical way. For example, in the instance of Messenger, the behavioral nudge was to present a 
warning message from a trusted provider and not from a generic source. The researchers even suggested 
the possibility of having a celebrity to provide the warning message, but this may only work if the in-
dividual is both well respected and well known. In the final testing of the framework, Coventry et al. 
(2014) opted to use an affective nudge by changing both the color and order of the available wireless 
networks. Those wireless networks that were deemed safe and secure appears in green towards the top 
of the list, with unsecure networks appearing lower down the list in red. Jeske et al. (2014) presented 
the results of this research, with these affective cues presented as an effective mechanism for helping 
individuals choose a more secure network. However, the researchers also noted that individual differ-
ences in the characteristics of users (such as proficiency with IT and poorer impulse control) also led 
to poorer security decisions, with nudges presenting an effective mechanism for changing the behavior 
of those with poor impulse control. To date this represents one of the few published empirical tests of 
behavioural nudges in an information security context, but focuses rather narrowly on just one element 
from the MINDSPACE framework.
In a final point, Bada, Sass, and Nurse (2014) suggested a series of key aspects that should be con-
sidered when designing cyber security awareness campaigns. These key points included:
1.  Security awareness training has to be professionally organized and prepared if it is to work – ad 
hoc training courses and inconsistency in the messages being conveyed will confuse the end user.
2.  The use of fear as an effective strategy to create change is not recommended, and there is potential 
that it could instil a sense of fear in those who can ill afford to take risks.
3.  Security education needs to be targeted and needs to be practical in nature – it needs to give the 
individual a concrete and achievable goal or action, which is in turn measurable and allows feedback 
to be provided.
Table 2. The MINDSPACE framework for behavior change
MINDSPACE cue Behavior
Messenger We are heavily influenced by who communicates information to us
Incentives Our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses
Norms We are strongly influenced by what others do
Defaults We ‘go with the flow’ of pre-set options
Salience Our attention is draw to what is novel and seems relevant to us
Priming Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues
Affects Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions
Commitments We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate acts
Ego We act in ways that makes us feel better about ourselves.
(from Dolan et al., 2012, p. 266)
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4.  Change needs to be sustainable and continuous – once you have the atmosphere to illicit change, 
this needs to be exploited and feedback should be provided throughout this period.
5.  Cultural contexts should be considered whenever cyber security awareness campaigns are being 
designed – there is not a one-size fits all approach that will work, and cultural nuances need to be 
taken into consideration
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
There are multiple directions in which future research could be taken, and a point that becomes apparent 
when exploring the available literature in this area is that the contribution human factors can make to 
cybersecurity is only just gaining a significant focus. A consistent and directed approach to exploring 
how aspects of human factors can serve to influence (and therefore also be targeted in order to mitigate) 
risk within any system is inherently important. In a similar way, the actual mechanisms used to bring 
awareness to individuals for effective cybersecurity behaviors also needs to be researched. The follow-
ing present some key areas for further research, but the scope of the area is overwhelming and deserves 
a more in-depth discussion than is currently possible.
Behavioral Nudges and ISA
The work by Dolan et al., (2012) in the development of the MINDSPACE framework for behavioral 
nudges presents a clear pathway for future exploration. A number of researchers have already noted 
that affective nudging techniques can serve as key mechanisms for eliciting more effective information 
security awareness (Coventry et al., 2014; Jeske et al., 2013; Turland et al., 2015). However much of this 
research does focus solely on the affective elements presented in the MINDSPACE framework, meaning 
that there is an even greater number of potential routes to follow for influencing behavioral change. It may 
be the case that using a number of key elements from the MINDSPACE framework could create more 
effective information security strategies, and by adding or subtracting various components, behavioral 
changes could be enhanced. It is evident that more detailed empirical research is needed in this area in 
order for such questions to be answered.
Individual Differences and Information Security
Individual differences in the context of information security and accidental insiderness could also 
provide another avenue for further research. As reviewed in this current chapter, there has been some 
clear attempts to highlight how individual differences can serve to influence attitudes and adherence to 
information security. Aspects such as poor impulse control, knowledge of IT and elements of personality 
have all been linked to information security behaviors. However, there are a huge amount of potential 
avenues that have been, to date, left unexplored and would provide a useful metric to not only measure 
ISA against, but also map potential behavioral nudges onto.
One area that has so far escaped in-depth exploration in the context of human factors in cybersecurity 
is those elements that lie outside of traditional ‘trait based’ personality factors. These factors link into 
the artifacts of modern life, and span a plethora of phenomena associated with the use of digital tech-
nology. For instance, there has been some discussion of how aspects such as cyberloafing and Internet 
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addiction could both influence ISA (for example see Hadlington, 2017; Hadlington & Parsons, 2017). 
The term cyberloafing has also been used to describe a process through which individuals actively 
engage the use of the companies’ Internet access during work hours for non-work related purposes 
(Ozler & Polat, 2012). Blanchard and Henle (2008) defined the concept of cyberloafing as “employees’ 
voluntary nonwork-related use of company provided email and Internet while working (p. 1068). With 
the prevalence of cyberloading being noted as being widespread in employment (Malachowski, 2005), 
exploring how ISA is affected by individuals engaging in cyberloafing provides another useful measure 
of how accepted social norms in the context of work-based use of information technology impacts on 
cybersecurity. Further work to expand on these findings, and to examine other associated variables, is 
deemed critical to move the field forward.
CONCLUSION
As noted in this chapter, exploring the role of the human element within the context of any cybersecurity 
is complex, multifaceted, and presents a potential conundrum to any security professional attempting to 
secure systems. The threats from the accidental insider, whether it is through ignorance, lack of atten-
tion, or human error is quickly becoming a growing concern to security professionals. Unlike malicious 
attacks from internal and external agents, the impact that UIT has is far harder to detect and mitigate 
but is potentially just as damaging. Movements towards a clearer understanding of how crucial aspects 
related to human factors have been made, but progress in this area is slow, fails to keep up with the 
constant evolution of the threat landscape, and is lacking a clear theoretical framework. Further work 
needs to be done in this area if we are to develop a clearer understanding of how human factors interact 
in the cybersecurity landscape. A focus not just on how these factors impact on business cybersecurity, 
but also personal cybersecurity is also important, and examining how these two aspects interact would 
also appear to be an aspect for future research. It is also apparent that current research on mitigating risks 
suggests that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to preventing lapses in cybersecurity is not currently working. 
More work focusing on why mitigating threats from human actors within the system is so difficult would 
appear to be urgently needed. Aligned to this, appropriate interventions need to be designed from the 
ground up, with a clear focus on their effectiveness rather than a ‘fire and forget’ attitude where there is 
no follow up to explore if they have worked.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Cyberloafing: Using work-based IT for non-work, personal purposes.
Insider Threat: A threat to an organisation by a former or current employee who, with malicious 
intent, deploys an exploit designed to either disrupt normal system functioning or exhort sensitive in-
formation for financial again.
Personality: A theoretical psychological construct that has permanence throughout the individual’s 
life span.
Unintentional Insider Threat: The threat posed by a current employee who, without malicious 
intent, causes a breach in organizational cybersecurity.
